Asked whether Kinshasa now regrets demanding the (still incomplete) withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission in the country (MONUSCO) – in light of the advances being made by Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Congo – DRC’s foreign minister Therese Kayikwamba Wagner responded by saying that areas no longer under UN jurisdiction have seen greater stability than MONUSCO-administered areas.
If she is right, what was one of the UN’s biggest and best funded ($1 billion annually) missions really about?
She accuses the international community of complicity in destabilising the DRC. M23 would not be able to wage war so successfully if not for Kigali’s backing, and Rwanda itself would likely not possess the capacity to back the M23 without international support. Despite issuing condemnation, the West – in particular, the US, UK and France – have refrained from taking concrete measures against Rwandan president, Paul Kagame.
Rwanda is heavily reliant on external funding. According to the World Bank, Kigali received $1.25 billion in official development assistance in 2021 – equivalent to 74% of central government spending. The EU in 2022 announced it would fund a Rwandan military campaign in Mozambique at $20 million. In 2024, Paris announced $400 million in funding for health, the environment and education. The UK also agreed a deal with Rwanda to host deported migrants worth $310 million in 2022.
All these initiatives have been undertaken with the full knowledge of Rwanda’s involvement in DRC’s destabilisation. Might economic interests be a consideration, especially considering how crucial Congolese minerals such as cobalt and gold are to global markets, and the role Kigali plays in acquiring them from the DRC?
Sources:
News:
https://x.com/sherwiebp/status/1883580216188301772
Rwanda and Int’l community
https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/The-Resurgence-of-the-M23-EN.pdf
M23 economic interests
https://apnews.com/article/congo-mining-m23-un-security-council-b11207ba887b352d702c3e4603d0c891